looks like a red cube and the property of being a red cube. In fact, many of them do not even work on humans, which brings me to my second point. This proposal has sparked debate about what counts as possessing a demonstrative concept. One perceiver, call her Nonvert, typically has R the roots essaywhuman live -experiences when she veridically perceives and is in causal contact with red things, and she typically has G -experiences when she veridically perceives and is in causal contact with green things. Tye (1995, 2000) has proposed that what makes a state have a content in the experiential way is that it has a certain functional role: it is poised for a certain kind of use in the cognitive system; and in addition it has non-conceptual content. Moreover, although all seem to represent both that something is moving and that the very same thing is not moving, they represent much more specific scenes as well, and these specifics clearly differ. Borrowing an example from Burge (1986 suppose that V 's gray arrays are typically caused by shadows, and occasionally caused by cracks; whereas V * lives in a world where the optical laws are different, and there are no instances of the sort of shadows. Other defenses of the state view include Stalnaker (1998a). One of the main motivations for experience-content internalism is the idea that only internally individuated states can figure in psychological explanations.
ZimZalaBim ( talk ) 21:11, 18 September 2006 (UTC). For discussion, see Casullo 1986.
These positions and others are discussed below. The issue is which of these properties can be perceived as being instantiated:.g., whether one can have a visual experience that represents that someone is trying to do something. This thesis does not mention concepts explicitly. However, the effects of learning a second language essay notion of accuracy conditions that defines the notion of content weve been working with leaves it open whether those conditions pertain to the world outside the mind or not. On this view, hallucinations can share the same phenomenology as cases of object-perception, and this phenomenology suffices for the subject to experientially entertain a special semantic entity akin to an open sentence. According to one type of argument that high-level properties can be represented in experience, experiences can be theory-laden, in the sense that being disposed to recognize an object or property influences the phenomenology and content of the experience. If no objections, I will. This view is defended. When concepts and beliefs are related in this way, belief content is said to be conceptual.